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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: An Assessment of the Impact of Maritime (In)Security in
the Gulf of Guinea (special emphasis on Sao Tome and Principe)
Degree: Master of Science
Maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is generally recognized as a
dynamic and complex phenomenon, that emerges from several onshore issues such as
poverty, poor governance, corruption, sea blindness, unemployment, border disputes,
and socio-economic-political exclusion. All these issues drive maritime insecurity in
the GoG region which is plagued by Piracy and Armed Robbery, theft of oil and other
cargo, illegal fishing and other maritime security threats. These challenges are a
paramount concern for countries in this region, particularly Sao Tome and Principe
(STP), a Large Ocean State located near the epicentre of most of the attacks. Maritime
insecurity in GoG not only poses a threat to STP’s current development status, but also
to the county’s future social and economic empowerment plans, such as the 2030
Transformation Agenda. Despite this eminent threat, the impact of maritime insecurity
issues in GoG on STP has not been previously investigated and established. This study,
therefore, aimed to assess the status quo of maritime insecurity issues in the GoG and
in STP, determine the key drivers of these issues, and assess their impact on the 2030
transformation agenda of Sao Tome and Principe. The study incorporated a review of
previous research on maritime insecurity in GoG, followed by data collection from 15
participants through an online survey tool, and finally the data was analysed using
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. Based on the research outputs,
Piracy and Armed Robbery were identified as the major threats of maritime insecurity
in the GoG and STP. Secondly, poverty, quick profit and poor governance were linked
as key motivators for people especially fishermen, public administration staff, and
unemployed persons to engage in these criminal activities. Thirdly, the research
demonstrated a positive correlation between maritime (in)security in the GoG and in
STP. The findings of this study, therefore, confirms that the maritime insecurity issues
in GOG affects the social wellbeing and economic development of STP, and further
highlights the specific drivers of these issues in the country and the region. The
findings also reveal weaknesses in the current maritime insecurity legislation and
mitigation strategies of STP. The study, therefore, recommends that effective
management of maritime security in STP and GoG requires a reinforcement of the
regional and international cooperation, especially towards revising and harmonising
the current legal normative framework, and development of improved corrective
action. Being a large ocean state, Sao Tome and Principe’s economy is highly
dependent on maritime activities, therefore it is imperative for the country to address
the key challenges and drivers of maritime insecurity, for successful implementation
of the 2030 Transformation Agenda.

KEYWORDS: Maritime insecurity, Gulf of Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Piracy,
Armed Robbery, Illegal fishing, corruption, governance, sea blindness, poverty, 2030
transformation agenda, cargo, oil, theft
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Maritime transport plays a vital role in the timely delivery of products and services
connecting markets and consumers, and it is responsible for the movement of more
than 90% of the world sea borne trade, using different maritime corridors for this
purpose(ICS, 2020; Shuo, 2019). However, these maritime corridors have been shown
to be unsafe in various latitudes, such as Somalia, Gulf of Aden, Indonesia,
Bangladesh, Peru, among others. Similar to the aforementioned areas, the GoG,
particularly the Niger Delta in Nigeria is considered to be an epicentre of maritime
insecurity (Lopez-Lucia, 2015).
In recent years, maritime insecurity has become a major concern in the international
maritime agenda (Shafa, B. M.2011). The Gulf of Guinea region has considered it as
major regional problem which jeopardizes the development of this strategic economic
area and endangers short-term maritime trade and the long-term stability of coastal
States (Kuppen, 2016). This situation has precipitated various countermeasures, taking
into account the shipping attacks in the GoG, which have exposed the vulnerability of
the maritime space in the region (Abdel Fattah, 2017).
The success of international efforts in reducing piracy incidences in the Gulf of Aden
has been followed by a dramatic increase of the menace in other areas such as the GoG
(Forum, 2019). The effective implementation of maritime security strategies has
become a challenge for countries whose maritime domain harbors rich and significant
natural resources (Kamal-Deen, 2015). From fisheries to hydrocarbons, the waters
surrounding the African continent and particularly the countries along the GoG region
harbor rich natural resources, which face a range of security threats. Besides, this
energy-potential region is geographically close to major world markets, in particular
European and North American markets (Kamal-Deen, 2015).
Maritime piracy in Africa, particularly in the GoG, finds support in a complex
composition of sea blindness, which means that, despite the ocean’s huge importance,
governments provide very little attention to what is happening in their waters. This can
be attributed to internal State issues such as political instability, under-equipped naval

1

forces, the ever-rising population in the region, unemployment among the youth who
constitute the majority of the population and deterioration of the marine environment
resulting from pollution, causing scarcity of fish (Boateng & Jiping, 2020). In addition,
the illegal movement of fire weapons has been made possible for fishermen who find
it more profitable changing rows for rifles, to avoid hunger and poverty.
In most cases, it is important to point out that the ease of acquiring money through
illegal means is being used by criminal organizations as an activity to finance their
objectives, as well as compromising and weakening certain strategic sectors of the
states and their structures.
The assumption of the existence of corruption and easy money “mindset” associated
with gaps in the legal system, a weak and permissible judicial system and the limited
technical-military capacity, opens the way for the rampant development and
installation of criminal organizations associated with piracy. This quietly endangers
the Democratic Rule of Law, thus guaranteeing the free and effective control of the
waters under its jurisdiction, as well as proactive cooperation in this field, which
endangers maritime security (Boateng & Jiping, 2020).
Maritime (in)security, has received several approaches in a bid to unravel it in different
perspectives. However, it still exists, and poses a serious concern to the international
maritime community and particularly to STP, an island nation located in the GoG,
which seeks to define the sea as one of its strategic pillars for development.
Sao Tome and Principe is a small island State that in recent years has been shifting
towards a new economic paradigm that is focused primarily on the sustainable use of
natural marine resources in different sectors. In addition, this paradigm aims to
leverage on tourism, offshore oil and gas, and marine transport in order to diversify its
“national economy which is mainly dependent on cocoa agriculture (Alegre, 2009).
This strategy has been established based on various factors such as its geostrategic
position of the archipelago, as well as the richness of its waters with immense potential
ranging from hydrocarbon to fishing, tourism activities as well as port services
(Government, 2015).
However, it is important to note that STP is also located in the GoG where increasing
maritime security threats such as piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, waste
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dumping, pollution among other criminal activities, affecting the exploitation of
coastal resources, the peaceful use of sea lines of communication as well as the
stability of littoral states, are happening (Ali & Tsamenyi, 2013). These challenges
have continually increased despite the palliative efforts made by the international
community in the framework of naval cooperation and in the attempt to establish
homogeneous practices to counteract (Ali & Tsamenyi, 2013).
The islands are therefore, facing a new challenge in their paradigm of maritime
security, due to the threats above, a lack of effective maritime domain awareness, a
robust legislative and judicial arrangements to deal with the transnational natures of
the issues and inadequate response capabilities. Through analysis of the report of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) - International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
expression such as “piracy attacks occur intermittently in waters of STP (ICC-IMB,
2019), or a general cargo was attacked near Sao Tome within the Nigeria/Sao Tome
and Principe in the Joint Development Zone – JDZ are more frequent (International,
2020). Such occurrences are due to several factors, particularly its geographical
proximity to the Niger Delta (Nigeria), which therefore renders it vulnerable to pirates
operating out of the Niger Delta.
Nevertheless, the maritime security threats above have not received adequate and
proportionate criminal classification, a worrying normative void for the country whose
transformation and development agenda and economic growth relies on revenues from
the sea and related services.
1.2 Problem Statement
According to Kamal Deen Ali “The GoG remains a region of great importance. In fact,
global interest for the region has risen, and the maritime domain is once again central
to this strategic outlook”(Kamal-Deen, 2015). Considered as a vast and diverse region,
stretching from Senegal to Angola, including approximately 6,000km of coastline, the
GoG is “endowed with vast marine and energy resources” (Okafor-Yarwood, 2019a)”,
being undoubtedly an important critical route for international commerce and a
geopolitical checkpoint for transportation of extracted oil, (EU, 2018) as well as goods
to and from the dynamic market of central and southern Africa (Pigeon, 2020).
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However, these strategic vectors have been threatened by various factors such as the
increase in pirate attacks, as well as the rise in criminal activity linked to piracy and
illicit crude oil trade, human trafficking, narcotics, weapons and pharmaceuticals,
illegal smuggling, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, waste dumping and
pollution (MVOMO, 2013).
The aforementioned threats have been a concern to the international community and
their impact pose a particular challenge to the maritime security in the archipelago of
STP which has a maritime dimension comparatively bigger (160 times) than its
terrestrial dimension (Governo, 2018). These threats require STP to reconsider and
address the gaps in laws, the low level of implementation of national laws, and the
institutional discord that may hamper its response capacity. In addition, the country
has defined the sea as one of its strategic pillars for development, whose revenue
generation streams from tourism activities to fisheries, deep water port services, and
oil exploration (Government, 2015).
1.3 Research Objectives
The Gulf of Guinea is faced with a complex situation of maritime insecurity (Pigeon,
2020), through the rise of criminal activity at sea, particularly maritime piracy being
the most viral threat having its epicentre in the Niger Delta – Nigeria (Lopez-Lucia,
2015). Sao Tome and Principe's geographical proximity to Equatorial Guinea and
particularly to the Niger Delta (Nigeria), where many piracy groups are based, raises
the risk of attacks on vessels serving the island nation in general and especially the
nascent oil industry.
STP has been relatively safe from the piracy acts experienced in the GoG, however the
situation has changed with increased number of attacks being registered in the
country’s EEZ area in 2019 and most recently in 2020. Furthermore, STP has a
transformation agenda, that includes the construction of a deep-water port, the
development of the nascent oil industry and the tapping of the undeniable potential for
tourism.
Therefore, given its development agenda, geostrategic position and proximity to GoG,
it is imperative for STP to identify the current maritime security threats, their drivers,
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and the gaps in the current legislation and mitigation strategies, in order to establish
and implement effective solutions to maritime insecurity.

1.3.1 General Objective
This study primarily aims to assess the maritime insecurity threats in the GoG and to
evaluate its potential impact on the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP.
1.3.2 Specific Objectives
1. To identify the maritime security threats in the GoG and STP
2. To assess the potential impact of the maritime insecurity on the 2030
Transformation Agenda of STP
3. To determine potential mitigation strategies to address maritime insecurity in
STP

1.3.3 Research questions
Main research question
What is the maritime security threat in the GoG, and how can it impact the new 2030
Transformation Agenda of STP?
Specific research questions
1. What are the maritime security issues threatening the GoG?
2. What are the maritime security issues affecting STP?
3. What are the drivers of maritime insecurity in GoG and STP?
4. What are the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies and their gaps?
5. How does maritime insecurity affect the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP?
6. What are the potential improvements needed for the current maritime
insecurity mitigation measures?

1.4 Research Methodology
The study applied the following research approaches:
1. Existing literature featured in publications for research as well as scholarly
articles World Maritime University library resources and internet resources
was used.
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2. An overview of maritime security and the conceptual relation between
maritime security and four important concepts, namely marine environment,
economic development, human security, and national security are described in
detail. Thereafter, the interdependence of these two concepts to the GoG will
be critically analyzed.
3. The researcher examine the legal framework with provisions that contribute to
maritime security in STP, including relevant international conventions and
principles of customary international law. This part of the research was
primarily a desk-based study, which the main focus of this paper was conduct
a detailed comparative study of national and international law.
4. To achieve the objective of this dissertation, the qualitative research method,
as well the doctrinal legal research method is used.
5. Data was collected from 15 participants from different institutions and
individuals such as: Prosecution Service; Ministry of Defense and Internal
Order; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and Communities; Ministry of
Finance and Blue Economy; Coast Guard; National Police; Maritime and Port
Institute; and Individuals who held leadership positions at the level of
government and public and private institutions to assesses the potential impact
of maritime insecurity in GoG in 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP (see the
survey in appendix B).

1.5 Expected outputs and Outcomes
The expected outputs of this study are unravel the current status quo of maritime
insecurity in GoG and in STP, main maritime security threats, drivers, the potential
impact on the STP Transformation Agenda, and the gaps in current mitigation
strategies, proposed improvements. In the other hand, the expected outcome of this
dissertation are expected to contribute to the critical knowledge of maritime
(in)security in GoG and provide a holistic view as well as proactive approach to
strengthen the maritime security in STP. Moreover, it will suggest actions that
governments in the region can consider to better control and mitigate criminal
activities at sea.
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1.6 Organisation of Chapters
This research has been organized with a structure of six chapters. Chapter one provides
the background of the research, the statement of the problem, the research objectives,
the research methodology and the structure of this research. Chapter two offers a
literature review of the current status quo of maritime threats in the GoG by assessing
the character of the GoG, highlighting the specific drivers of maritime insecurity and
the major threats, as well as the Regional Organizations that contribute to the
improvement of maritime security in the region. Chapter three provides an overview
of STP and discusses its complex relationship with the sea, the existing legal
framework related to maritime security, the evolution of cooperation in the field of
maritime security, and the maritime security strategy of STP. Chapter four assesses
the relevance of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, the challenges facing the
economy and social development and the relevance of the sea in the STP economy.
Chapter five assesses the impact of maritime insecurity on 2030 transformation agenda
of STP through the findings and correlation between maritime insecurity in the Gulf
of Guinea and maritime security in STP. Chapter six provides a conclusion and
recommendations to overcome the identified weaknesses and challenges.
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CHAPTER TWO - THE CURRENT STATUS QUO OF MARITIME THREATS
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
Chapter two features a literature review of the status quo of maritime threats in the
GoG by assessing the characteristics of the GoG, secondly, the chapter highlights the
specific drivers of maritime insecurity and the major threats, and finally the Regional
Organizations that contribute to the improvement maritime security in the region.

2.1 Maritime Security
It is ab initio important to address special attention to understand the term maritime
security. The term “maritime security” has become ubiquitous, for contemporary
policymaking, and very evident in the different strategic agenda, although Maritime
Security is a buzzword, there has been no consensus interpretation on the term
(Bueger, 2015).
Understood by some practitioners as a nebulous concept, maritime security
encapsulates a large task involving several entities from international, public and
private sectors aiming at, preserving the freedom of the seas, facilitating and defending
commerce as well as maintaining good governance at sea (Feldt et al., 2013).
The U.S. Navy defines maritime security as “tasks and operations conducted to protect
U.S. sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce,
and to counter maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime,
piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration” (U.S. Navy,
2006).
In 2015, Bueger proposed an alternative approach which focuses on defining maritime
security relationships with other concepts dealing with maritime space governance. In
particular, as he concluded, the relationship to the following four principles is
considered as vital: sea power, marine safety, the blue economy and human resilience
(Bueger, 2015). This is described in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Maritime security matrix.
Source: Inspired by Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy.
These four principles are set out and point to different issues of maritime governance
that may or may not be incorporated into maritime security. Sea power is concerned
with the role of military force and the maritime aspect of inter-state warfare, and
national survival challenges. Marine safety, such as issues shipping control, port
security, seafarer health, search and rescue service, but also marine environment
protection. Blue economy is concerned with the commercial possibilities the maritime
provides, from resource extraction to tourism. Lastly, human security considers coastal
communities' living conditions dependent on the sea, in particular, their food security
and the possibility of their marginalization in territorially-oriented governments
(Bueger, 2015).

2.2 Overview and Importance of the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea is often painted as a vast and diverse region which covers two
important geopolitical and economic areas (see Figure 2). This includes the Economic
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Community of Central African States - ECCAS and the Economic Community of West
African States - ECOWAS (Kuppen, 2016). It encapsulates about 16 countries whose
coastline is approximately 6,000 kilometres from Senegal to Angola, and including the
island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The maritime domain of this region is
endowed with a vast wealth of minerals, hydrocarbon deposits and diverse marine and
fishery resource species. Its waters serve as a vital international trade route, and a
shipping spot check as evidenced in the report by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood &
Maisie Pigeon (Pigeon, 2020).

Figure 2: The Maritime Regional Architecture zones in the Gulf of Guinea.
Source: (Kuppen, 2016).
This region is surrounded by some of Africa’s most proficient oil producers, including
Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea. Therefore, the Gulf is a major
transit route for oil tankers on their way to international markets (Harbo, n.d.).
According to Mañe, the geographical position of the GoG embodies an important
comparative advantage for oil supply (Mañe, 2005). Indeed, despite its relative
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proximity to the world’s main consumers of energy including North America and
Western Europe, the GoG benefits from the absence of narrow shipping maritime lanes
know as checkpoints, between the region and those parts of the world.
Based on previous work (González, 2016) on the turbulent background of political
turmoil in the historic oil zone in the Middle East, the GoG has become one of the
areas more attractive to the interests of large transnational capital in recent years,
owing to its commercial, geographical, and political characteristics, situated in the
confluence of the West and Central African coasts, at the Atlantic Ocean. In this sense,
several authors such as (Boateng & Jiping, 2020) have recognized that the GoG is a
region that draws a lot of interest to many nations in Latin America, Europe and West
Africa. This is because these countries depend on this region for conducting their
business. According to Dakuku Peterside, the GoG is a strategic maritime region in
the world, having geographical contiguity to Europe and the Americas. It is a veritable
source of global energy needs, food stock supply as well as raw materials for
industries. It is also, a vital transportation route and relevant as a ‘‘flow’’ and
manoeuvre space for military operations (IDN, 2020).
The region's market size is estimated to have around 470 million consumers with $950
billion in Gross domestic product (GDP), approximately $180.50 billion in exports
and $105.70 billion in imports (GMSC, 2019). It is the hub of extensive trans-Atlantic
trade linking Africa with Europe and the Americas. The geographical contiguity with
Western Europe in relation to the Middle East and Asia strengthens the significant
competitive advantage (GMSC, 2019) of the transportation of goods and people by
rising sea transport costs.

2.3 Drivers of Maritime Insecurity
Although the GoG has seen an increase in the rate of insecurity issues coupled with
the robberies in the local water territories and piracy in deep-sea, the majority of these
factors have contributed to the rise of insecurity in the GoG.
Lawrence Ofosu Boateng and Jiping stress that a political, economic, social,
technological, environmental and legal (PESTEL) analysis of maritime piracy and
maritime security in the GoG show that the region is affected by several factors that
compromise the ability to counterattack crimes at sea such as piracy and army
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robberies (Boateng & Jiping, 2020). The factors range from political, economic, social,
technological, legal and environmental. In the same base of thought, (GMSC, 2019)
establishes that matters such as weak governments and poor implementation of the
laws and conventions, increase in population, lack of unemployment and poverty are
drivers that make youths engage in these criminal activities at sea (see Figure 2).
The problem of maritime insecurity in the GoG is not a new phenomenon (Jacobsen
& Nordby, 2015). Piracy itself has a long history but in the GoG, a contemporary form
of piracy has flourished in the last 25 years. Lindskov Jacobsen and Riber Nordby
underline that pirates are not born at sea. Onshore issues such as sea blindness,
unemployment/youth unemployment and poverty, political disputes, corruption and
weak governance and, legal challenges affect maritime security and challenges that in
different ways feed into the problem of maritime insecurity in the GoG. In the same
line of analysis Jacobsen, (Jacobsen, 2017) stresses that it is generally known that
maritime security in the GoG is a highly dynamic phenomenon involving a number of
issues (legal deficiencies, insufficient military hardware, and problems such as
corruption, political instability and youth unemployment) as well as a multiplicity of
external respondents (Jacobsen, 2017).
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Figure 3: Vicious Cycle of Maritime insecurity.
Source: (Pigeon, 2020)
Many theories have been proposed to explain the drivers of maritime insecurity in the
GoG. Although the literature covers a wide variety of such theories, this review will
describe the following eight major drivers emerging repeatedly throughout the
literature reviewed.
1-Governance and corruption,
2-Economic and socio-political exclusion,
3-Sea blindness,
4-Weak law enforcement,
5-Poverty, unemployment and densely populated urban centres,
6-Border disputes,
7 -Scarcity of refined petroleum products,
8 - Oil discoveries.
A comprehensive review of the above topics will create a better understanding of the
true origins of the drivers of maritime insecurity in the GoG.
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2.4 Major Drivers of Maritime Insecurity
2.4.1 Governance and Corruption
As described by (Lopez-Lucia, 2015) corruption is pervasive in the navies, maritime
administrations and law enforcement agencies of the GoG countries which limit their
capacity to deal with criminality. There is evidence that corruption and complicity that
exists in Nigeria significantly contributes to the prevalence of piracy in the GoG
(Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). In line with the above, some officials provide political
protection to pirates and prevent their arrest or order the release of pirate vessels
(Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).
Hastings and Phillips argue that, in the GoG, traditional State political institutions and
formal economy institutions primarily restrict and encourage informal networks of
business engaged in piracy (Hastings et al., 2015). More indirectly, corruption ensures
that only a small percentage of oil revenues meet local communities. More indirectly,
corruption means that only a small amount of oil revenue reaches the local populations,
this leading to poverty and unemployment which can turn people into pirate (Fiorelli,
2014). Corruption is a sensitive problem and is always difficult to deal with (Jacobsen
& Nordby, 2015).
Transparency over oil revenues is almost non-existent, allowing both the political class
and international private companies to monopolize them (I. C. Group, 2012). In
addition, the elite are also involved and allow the criminal networks that are
established around the oil sector.
2.4.2 Economic and Socio-Political Exclusion
The root causes of maritime instability are the truncated socioeconomic expectations'
for the vast majority of GoG people, and economic marginalization, frequently
compounded by political exclusion (MVOMO, 2013).
A notable trend is that poverty rates are much higher on the coast than in areas within
the hinterland, rendering them more vulnerable to criminal gang opportunities. As
reported by the ICC International Maritime Bureau the scale of piracy is an indication
of the radicalization and inclination of distressed populations to turn to crime (I. C.
Group, 2012).
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Clear evidence suggests that the increase in piracy in the GoG is linked particularly to
the protesting local militias in the Niger Delta against marginalization and unfair
distribution of oil revenues at the cost of the overwhelming majority of citizens living
in severe poverty (I. C. Group, 2012).
2.4.3 Sea Blindness
“Sea blindness” was described as a 'lack of general maritime knowledge' at the
political level and within the general public (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). It was also
highlighted as a key obstacle to addressing effectively the piracy threat in this region.
According to (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015) sea blindness is recognized as a significant
onshore obstacle that inhibits the degree of political involvement needed to tackle the
piracy and maritime crime problem more effectively.
2.4.4 Weak Law Enforcement
Poor law enforcement applies to three categories: weak legal system and lack of
effective legislation; lack of training and expertise (patrolling, forensics or equipment
maintenance); and lack of competence (Nnamdi K. Obasi, 2011).
According to Barrios and Luntumbue, GoG states suffers from an ability deficit to
protect and track their maritime jurisdiction (Barrios, 2013; Luntumbue, 2011). The
States have inadequate and deficient coastguard service as well as infrastructure and
relatively few patrols.
Evidence has showed that Nigeria is the only country in the region with sufficient
naval or coastguard capacity to deal with maritime crimes (MVOMO, 2013). As such,
it leaves unanswered most of the distress calls it receives due to the expansive nature
of the GoG region and state sovereignty issues (I. C. Group, 2012).
Although this can be attributed in part to corruption by diverting funds from building
maritime capabilities, a number of analyses also point to the neglect by the GoG states
of their maritime jurisdiction, and their lack of emphasis on maritime protection
(House, 2013; MVOMO, 2013).
2.4.5 Poverty, Unemployment and Densely Populated Urban Centers
Lopez Lucia argues that scholars and researchers also highlight the high level of
unemployment in the GoG as being one of the underlying causes of piracy (LopezLucia, 2015), motivating illegal activity and gang culture as a viable financial
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opportunity and a sense of social identity (see also (Ukeje, 2015); (Jacobsen & Nordby,
2015).
The high level of youth unemployment rates in the GoG countries is one of the root
causes of piracy most frequently discussed by analysts and scholars. This promotes
illegal activities such as oil theft, armed robbery or trafficking because they can be the
only viable sustainable source for financial resources (Barrios, 2013), (House, 2013).
Additionally, involvement in criminal gangs also gives the unemployed youth a sense
of 'social belonging’ (Barrios, 2013).
In a background of extreme economic inequality and tensions resulting from migration
from internal and political conflicts, these highly populated urban centres’ create
conditions for increased crime (I. C. Group, 2012).
2.4.6 Border Disputes
Since oil discoveries, border disputes between the GoG states have escalated. The risk
is that the disputed areas become ungovernable allowing for the proliferation of illegal
activities. These contested areas also hamper the already complicated cooperation
between the countries concerned security forces (I. C. Group, 2012).
The two major conflicts in the region are between Nigeria and Cameroon over 2008
officially terminated Bakassi Peninsula, and between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire over
their maritime borders following the 2010 discovery of oil in the territorial waters of
Ghana; however, the latter has been settled judicially by the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, 2017).
2.4.7 Scarcity of Refined Petroleum Products
Despite Nigeria having an offshore extraction industry, the country has a shortage of
refined petroleum products. Although Nigeria has four refineries, the refineries do not
operate at their maximum capacity. This has made the nation a net importer of refined
petroleum products (Onuoha, 2013).
This situation has fostered a growing black market for stolen oil; the proliferation of
illegal refineries; the smuggling of subsidized fuel from Nigeria to neighbouring
countries; increased incentives for pirates to target tankers with refined petroleum
products (I. C. Group, 2012), as well as the lack of maintenance of legal refineries has
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led to the uncoordinated supply of petroleum products to Nigerian communities; thus
promoting furthering social discontent (Nnamdi K. Obasi, 2011).
2.4.8 Oil Discoveries
New oil discoveries in the GoG countries may serve as a catalyst for violence and
crime through various mechanisms, inter alia, creating or exacerbating tensions
between countries hampering bilateral and regional cooperation to resolve maritime
insecurity (MVOMO, 2013). In addition, there are possible expansion of transnational
groups along the coast following new opportunities and incentives (Luntumbue, 2011)
and undermining economic growth and institutional productivity through the
processes distribution of welfare effect (Nnamdi K. Obasi, 2011).

2.5 Major Threats of Maritime Security
In this section the author provides an overview or a short description of the maritime
security threats to lay a foundation to better understand the correlation between
maritime (in)security in the GoG and maritime security in STP, addressed in the
chapter five.

Maritime security threats have many faces; however, piracy and armed robbery
(Anyimadu, 2013; Feldt et al., 2013), hold all the attention in different preview works,
when it is come to assess the threats at sea in the GoG (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). A
number of other illegal maritime activities were also pointed out and deserve the
attention of other authors. In the same vein, Abiodun et al. pointed out that the
maritime sector in the GoG has been troubled by a number of security problems for a
very long time now, but it seems that the piracy issue has gained more attention at the
cost of other forms of insecurity(Francis Abiodun & Mohammed Yakubu Dahiru,
2020).
Maritime insecurity in the GoG is recognized not only for the presence of piracy but
also for the flourishing of other threats. Various dimensions of insecurity besieging the
GoG which include piracy and armed robbery often cited as the main threat as well as
theft of oil and other cargo, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,
trafficking of counterfeit items, people, narcotics and arms. Yet, these threats are
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coupled with practices such as hostage-taking or kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering
among others.
2.5.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta is currently the geographic centre of the current
wave of piracy in the GoG; however, this is spreading to the larger region. According
to Pigeon, pirate groups in the Niger Delta are directly responsible for destabilizing
the broader GoG waters by targeting vessels and kidnapping crew members (Pigeon,
2020). Evidence shows that 98 incidents of piracy and armed robbery of vessels were
reported in the GoG between January and December 2019 (Pigeon, 2020).
In this regard, the 2019 the Annual Report from International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
related to Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships demonstrated that kidnapping of
crew is not just a phenomenon challenging one sector of shipping, but all vessels have
been targeted. Furthermore, evidence shows that the GoG is responsible for more than
90% of global crew kidnappings, an increase of 50% per year, with 121 crew members
kidnapped in 2019 compared to the same period (1 January – 31 December 2019 ) in
2018 with 78 (ICC, 2020).
2.5.2 Theft of Oil and other Cargo
Because oil tankers and cargo are big and valuable, these ships carrying expensive
cargo are designed to be hard to board. However, bearing in mind the value of the
goods these enormous vessels are becoming the pirates’ special target in the GoG as
can been seen in the 2019 Annual Report from the International Maritime Bureau
related to Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ICC-IMB, 2020).
Theft of oil is often the result of concerted actions among local gangs, accomplices in
the oil industry and security agencies and organized crime networks which take
advantage of the weaknesses resulting from the inspection of the extensive maritime
area representing the GoG as well as the level of corruption that exists in the various
sectors dealing with this issue (Adejimi Osinowo, 2015)
The limited capability of military and law enforcement forces to respond to robbery at
sea, hijacking and kidnapping further encourages these practices. Few countries in the
region provide or authorize Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels
(SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) for merchant vessels within their
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EEZ and/or territorial waters (ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, 2020).
The Nigerian authorities do not allow shipping companies the use of foreign armed
guards, which is a key ingredient in suppressing pirates from the Gulf of Aden, as well
as restricting the fight against pirates in the territorial waters of West Africa, where the
majority of attacks take place (IUMI, 2020).
In the same line, the region's shortage of refined oil products has created a black market
for stolen oil, prompting pirates to target oil tankers. Often the economic profits from
piracy can be very high, while the risk of being captured, let alone punished, is low
(Rohwerder & Steffen, 2016).
2.5.3 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
Evidence shows that, fish accounts for up to 80 percent of the animal protein of the
population in GoG and is often the only source of animal protein consumed in the area
by coastal communities (Okafor-Yarwood, 2018). It also adds to the income of many
of the region's countries. However, the capacity of this resource to continue
contributing to the socio-economic development of countries in the region is
existentially threatened by an unfolding ocean catastrophe triggered by unsustainable
activities such as IUU fishing, which accounts for more than 65% of legally recorded
catches (Okafor-Yarwood, 2019b). The IUU fishing is commonly found to be
associated with corruption (Interpol ES, 2014), forgery, fraud, and money laundering.
Additionally, there are other crimes that often involve fishing vessels, such as piracy
or armed robbery at sea, drugs or arms trades, and mixed migration (Denton & Harris,
2019). Increased threat to regional security is also due to the effects of declining
fisheries. On the other hand, Yarwood argues that unabated IUU fishing in GoG is due
to the lack of awareness of their maritime domain by the respective government,
reflected in the dearth of human resources and inadequate financial investment to solve
maritime security problems, and lack of cooperation between countries in the region,
which makes current monitoring operations ineffective(Okafor-Yarwood, 2019c).
Those affected in the absence of state support to create resilience to vulnerabilities are
tempted (Kamal-Deen, 2015) to participate in illegal activities that have wider
consequences for regional security.
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2.5.4 Trafficking of Counterfeit Items, People, Narcotics and Arms
In the GoG, at the interface between porous land and sea borders, organized crime in
the form of drugs, human beings, arms, rough diamonds, counterfeit goods, illegal
waste trafficking, cybercrimes and related money laundering also occurs (UNION,
2014). Illicit smuggling of counterfeit goods is also associated with other serious
crimes, and is a lucrative route for organized crime gangs, with a mix of high income
and reduced fines arising from increased social tolerance of other crimes.
It is considered a highly lucrative industry, where criminals rely on persistently high
demand for inexpensive goods combined with low cost of production. Nevertheless,
as a matter of fact, many seaports in the busy Guinean Gulf lack proper oversight,
which is a vulnerability for authorities and certainly an opportunity for criminal
organizations. Faced with this lacuna, corruption is gaining ground and can further
undermine the apparent ability allowing for the development of contraband routes
(Anyimadu, 2013b).

2.6 Regional Counterpiracy Efforts
The Global Maritime Security Conference 2019 stressed the strategic role the maritime
industry plays as a ‘value creator and growth engine’ in economies of nations. For this
reason, maritime security in the GoG is not only a regional challenge but also a
worldwide challenge that requires high-level commitment and a collective response
altogether, along with effective interventions at the global, continental, regional and
country levels (GMSC, 2019).
The threats to the GoG raised by piracy have been apparent for quite some time now
with attacks on shipping that have exposed the insecurity of maritime space in the
region. This situation has driven a number of regional associations such as the Gulf of
Guinea Commission (GCC), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) to build and activate a
variety of countermeasures (Kuppen, 2016).
In this context, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions (2018) in
2011 and (2039) in 2012, paving the way for further international collaboration to
protect ships and counter-piracy in the GoG. The first resolution (2018) adopted by
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the Security Council in October 2011 called on West African states to create and
improve domestic laws and regulations to formally criminalize piracy and armed
robbery at sea, and to collaborate with the shipping industry, and with each other, to
establish an information-sharing system that would monitor incidents in the region
(IMO, 2017).
Based on that approach, the resolution (2039) encouraged countries along the GoG to
work together on establishing a counterpiracy strategy that would cover West and
Central Africa. In 2013, with the help of the International Maritime Organization,
regional multilateral bodies — the ECOWAS, the ECCAS, and the GCG cooperatively
formed an agreement known as the Code of Conduct for Yaoundé (Ifesinachi, K.;
Nwangwu, 2015). The Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed
robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in West and Central Africa,
encompasses a wide variety of maritime offences (Abdel Fattah, 2017; IMO, 2017).
Signatory nations, including all states bordering the gulf, and island nations,
coordinate the use of two regional information-sharing centres, the Central African
Regional Maritime Security Center and the West African Regional Maritime Security
Center, linked via the Interregional Coordination Center - ICC in Cameroon 's capital,
Yaoundé.
In other words, this instrument provides international stakeholders with a mechanism
for the design of commitments and training activities, improving cooperation between
them. Further, it allows people and centres operating at operational and tactical levels
to collaborate on a multi-national basis in areas such as information sharing and, where
local circumstances require it, organized joint patrols, liaison officers and hot pursuit
(Pigeon, 2020).
Although, the Yaoundé Code has proven to be a promising mechanism for enhancing
synergy and multinational cooperation, there are still some obstacles as lack of
political will, technical and budget that slow or affect the sharing information and to
respond promptly to it.
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CHAPTER THREE – CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO
TOME AND PRINCIPE
Chapter three provides an overview of STP and discusses its complex relationship with
the sea, its existing legal framework related to maritime security, the evolution of
cooperation in the field of maritime security, and the maritime security strategy of
STP.
3.1 Overview of Sao Tome and Principe
São Tomé and Príncipe is an archipelago located in the heart of the GoG, consisting
of two main islands and adjacent islets. Crossed by the line of Equator, the archipelago
has a total area of 1001 km2, and is administratively divided into six districts (São
Tome) and an autonomous region (Principe).
However, arising from an ancient volcanic activity, the archipelago has a very rugged
relief, with mountainous summits that reach 1,500 m. Considered one of the smallest
countries in Africa, STP has no land borders and is located about 250km /350 km off
the west African coast (see Figure 4), off Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and
Nigeria, between latitude 0° 20' 49,02" North and 6° 44' 41,85" East (São Tomé
Island), and latitude 1° 36' 46,87" North and longitude and 7° 23' 39.65 "East (Príncipe
Island), according to the ellipsoid used international (M. Ribeiro, 2020).
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Figure 4: The archipelagic baseline and the outer limits of the territorial sea,
contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of São Tomé and Príncipe.
Source:https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/STP.
htm
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Located relatively close to the coast of Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon, STP have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that covers approximately one
hundred and seventy thousand square kilometres (170,000 km2), and is, therefore, an
extensive maritime area to ensure security (Governo, 2018).
As part of its external relations, São Tomé and Príncipe is a member of several
international and regional organizations, including: Economic Community of Central
African States (CEEAC), African Union (AU), Community of Portuguese Language
Countries (CPLP), United Nations (UN) and International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), Commission of Gulf Guinea (CGG), International
Maritime Organization (IMO) (Weltzen, & Alegre, 2017).
According to official data from the National Statistics Institute, the country's
population in 2017 was about 197,700. In 2020 the estimated population number is
210 249 with just over 50% women (106 121) and a young population (around 60%
under 25 years of age). It is currently estimated that 62% of the population have been
affected by poverty. This is mainly due to limited employment opportunities,
particularly for young people (INE, 2020).
São Tomé and Príncipe ranks higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa on the
UNDP Human Development Index and has made good progress in improving other
social indicators. Sao Tome and Principe has a gross primary education level of 110%,
a life expectancy of 66 years, an infant mortality rate for children under five years of
age per 51 live births, access to an improved water source for 97% of the population
and access to electricity for 60% of the population (Morais, 2018).
The former Portuguese colony, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe
(RDSTP), became independent on 12 July 1975. Since its rise to independence, the
country has experienced two types of political regimes: the one-party system from
1975 to 1990 and multiparty (democratic) from 1991 to the present day. The
Constitution of 10th September 1990 enshrined the birth of the second Republic. The
Second Republic is synonymous, in the Sao Tome context, with openness to
democracy, multiparty system, separation of powers (Género, 2012).
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With a gross national income (GNI) per capita estimated at $1,847 estimated by the
IMF, STP is one of the smallest economies in Africa and a country extremely
vulnerable to external shocks (FMI, 2018). The State of Sao Tomé and Principe, as a
micro-economy and little diversified, is very dependent on external aid and financing
(W. B. Group, 2018). The most dynamic sector of this economy is the tertiary sector,
with a weight of approximately 73% of GDP, with trade and tourism services having
the greatest importance in this sector (INE, 2017). The country's trade balance is in
deficit, reaching around -28.6% of GDP. In order to provide greater stability to its
currency, in 2010 the country adopted a fixed exchange rate policy, by anchoring its
euro currency, in establishing an exchange rate (1 EUR = 24.5 STN), leading to lower
inflation growth, which has been around 5% (FMI, 2018).
The GDP in 2019 grew by 2.7%, identical to the growth registered in 2018, according
to the data of the General State Budget for 2020 (Nacional, 2019). The projections for
GDP growth for 2020, pointed to a growth of 4%, but in the face of the current Covid19 pandemic crisis, the UNDP estimates that GDP will contract by around 19%
(PNUD, 2020).
There is a strong dynamic in the country, embodied in wide-ranging reforms covering
several sectors, including the judicial system, aiming at improving the public sector,
giving credibility to the country's image and attracting investments that can in turn
boost the private sector in the same way. However, due to their physical characteristics
and the form of governance, they remain as key challenges for sustained and inclusive
growth, high public debt, a deficit in revenue collection and a deficient economic
infrastructure - including transportation, roads, water and energy (W. B. Group, 2018).
In addition, the economy has a narrow export base and is highly dependent on external
support.

3.2 Complex relationship with the sea
São Tome and Principe, despite being geographically characterized by their insularity,
their relationship with the sea is complex or marked by underestimated importance in
the first years after their independence. In this period the sea was seen only as an
economic resource for subsistence, a reservoir for fishing activity, and above all
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framed as a threat, taking into account the tensions experienced at the time and the fear
of attacks to subvert power (Nascimento, 2011).
In this context, there was no local debate on the potential of the sea, so there was also
no clear awareness of the threats to maritime security. This situation began to change
with the discovery of offshore oil, a fact that shaped the country's policy, the
relationship with the sea, and the relationship with neighbouring countries above all
allowed the archipelago to draw the maritime boundary delimitation agreement (Legal,
2018).
With respect to maritime boundary delimitation, São Tomé and Príncipe signed two
treaties: one with Gabon1, on 26 April 2001, and the other with Equatorial Guinea2, on
26 June 1999. There is no Treaty on the delimitation of boundaries concluded with
Nigeria3 21 February 2001, but only a joint oil and other resource exploitation treaty
situated in the EEZ of both states (M. Ribeiro, 2020).
Added to this picture is an old desire that still exists today, namely building a deepwater port to serve as a rotating platform of services for the region. However,
unfortunate facts also mark this timid shift in consciousness. Ship casualties that took
lives in the seas of STP put the relationship with the sea on the agenda, taking into
account the authorities uncertainty to help ships in times of distress as was the case
with ships such as, Bambazele in 2002, Marisol in 2006, Therese in 2008 and Micau
in 2010 (Nascimento, 2011).
These problems are still echoed today when it comes to safety of navigation; however,
the geostrategic character of the archipelago coexists with an adjustment in the

1

Agreement on the Delimitation of the Maritime Border between the Gabonese Republic and the
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, 26 April 2001,
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GABSTP2001MB.PDF
2 Treaty concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, 26 June 1999;
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GNQSTP1999MB.PDF
3 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of Areas of the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States, 21 February 2001,
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/STPNGA2001.PDF
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importance of the sea on its agenda and with the magnitude of the challenges related
to maritime insecurity in the region.

3.3 Legal framework related to maritime security
The complex relationship with the sea and, consequently, the security described above,
is also undoubtedly felt in the political agenda and in the legal order of the archipelago.
Therefore, timidly STP started looking at the sea, and its security features, gradually
then moved forward towards the construction of a legal framework that could respond
to specific situations linked to the sea, particularly establish the blue economy.
This legal structure was metamorphosed but accentuated by the discovery of oil, the
rising interest in fishing in the country's territorial waters, the fatal marine casualties
as well as the ratification of certain conventions that the country is part of. Sao Tome
and Principe is a party to the United Nations (UN) Law of the Sea Convention, the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Drug Convention),
and the Convention Against Corruption. In addition, Sao Tome and Principe is also a
party to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as
amended by 1978 Protocol, the Convention on the International Regulation for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), the International Convention on Standards
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1978), the
International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annexes
I,II and IV, and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and its Protocol, among others Sao Tome and
Principe is also a member of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (Weltzen, & Alegre,
2017). In addition to the set of the aforementioned conventions, the country adopted
the Integrated Maritime Strategy for Africa 2050 and the respective action plan,
adopted the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Agenda of United Nations for
2030 (Governo, 2018).
From 2000 to 2018 the approach to the sea has been gradually changing and so does
the need to look at all the EEZ matters, including security. This metamorphosis caused
the flourishing of several legal instruments, including:
1. Law nº 09/2001 - Law on Fisheries and Haulic Resources;
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2. Law nº 13/2007 - Maritime Safety and Prevention against Sea Pollution laws;
3. Law 6/2012 - The Penal Code of STP
4. Decree-law 9 / 2012- Organics of the Armed Forces of STP;
5. Law nº 11 / 12- Regulates drug trafficking, consumption and detention in the
territory of the STP;
6. Law 6/2016 International Cooperation in Criminal Matters;
7. Decree-Law No. 2/2018 – Approves the Maritime Security Strategy;
8. Decree law nº 03 / 2018 - Approves the Maritime Authority System;
9. Law No. 01/2018 - Judiciary Police Organic;
10. Decree-Law No. 04/2018 - Approves the Creation of the National Maritime
Authority;
11. Decree Law No. 5/2018 - Maritime Jurisdiction Offenses Regime.
It is still true that these legal instruments fill the legal framework with provisions that
contribute to maritime security. However, according to Marta Ribeiro in the report of
evaluation of the legal framework of STP applicable to combating crime at sea, they
are several weaknesses in the legal framework. Furthermore, the intensification of
piracy in the EEZs of Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as in the EEZ of São Tomé and
Príncipe and in the joint exploitation zone, illegal fishing and related illegal activities,
as well as the illegal transfer or supply of fuel to ships are, at present, the main threats
to prevent and combat and that require a robust legal framework and the operational,
human and material means necessary for its application (M. Ribeiro, 2020).
In this regard, besides pointing out several weaknesses in the legal framework, the
abovementioned report recommends the reviewing and updating the legal regimes in
force, which can guarantee the legal support of the actions taken by the authorities as
well as eliminating shocks of competence and responsibilities between the authorities.
This revision will ensure in a sustained manner a continuous routine of monitoring
maritime spaces, as well as collecting and processing data on illegal activities that are
actually practiced in the maritime spaces of São Tomé and Príncipe.

3.4 Evolution of cooperation in the field of maritime security
Suspicious movements of vessels, especially on the STP waters were detected by the
radars installed in STP with the military-technical support of the United States of
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America, began to awaken the authority to the potential risk from the threats (Thiago
Melo, 2014; VOA, 2010).
In June 2013 STP and Portugal signed a cooperation agreement that involves the
Portuguese armed forces in the surveillance and inspection of the EEZ (Veiga, 2013).
The same agreement incorporated an additional protocol in March 2015 to allow the
use of the Portuguese air force in the inspection of the territorial sea of STP, an act that
brings added value to bilateral cooperation and the security of the region (Economist,
2015). In the face of growing security challenges in the region, a Memorandum of
Understanding that allows the training of the Coast Guard and the signing of a new
Defence Cooperation Framework program for the period 2018-2020 saw the light of
day in February 2018 (Portugal, 2018; TélaNón, 2018b).
This entire process has been complemented by the presence of the Zaire warship of
the Portuguese Republic, which operates with the mixed garrison made up of
Portuguese and saotomean soldiers, in patrolling and supervising operations in the
EEZ. This illustrates the importance of bilateral cooperation between the two
Portuguese-speaking countries and undoubtedly contributing through a joint effort to
the security of the region, carrying out dissuasive actions against maritime piracy (A.
S. Ribeiro, 2019). Despite the dissuasive effect it has in the STP, EEZ as well as in the
GoG region, the Zaire Ship is 48 years old and the average life expectancy for a ship
is 40 years (Veiga, 2020).
Therefore, it is important to underline that, in parallel with technical-military
cooperation with Portugal, the cooperation with Brazil has also been concentrated on
naval defence, which allowed the creation of the first marine unit in STP. Both military
cooperation has allowed increasing the capacities of the STP Coast guard (TélaNón,
2018a).

3.5 Maritime security strategy of Sao Tome and Principe
São Tome and Principe intend to achieve and strengthen maritime governance by
2030, through a national, regional, and international approach that involves the
synergy of several stakeholders. This approach is based on the desire to create
conditions that allow the establishment of a safe maritime environment.
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In this context, the country is aware of the responsibilities that follow the great
extension of the EEZ, with approximately 160,000 km2, which corresponds to
approximately 160 times of its land area. These responsibilities result from its
geographic characteristics as an Island State and the significant territorial
discontinuity, in the waters under its jurisdiction and in the light of the International
Treaties and Agreements to which it is a signatory. São Tomé and Príncipe has
developed a Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) seeking to respond to the need to
proceed with the surveillance and protection of its sovereign space, as well as meeting
the challenges and opportunities that arise in the management of the maritime space
GoG, threatened by the remarkable growth of transnational crimes (Governo, 2018).
Maritime Security Strategy represents an important capital document that aims to
define the fundamental aspects aligned with the overall strategy of the State for the
fulfilment of the objectives of the Maritime Security policy. This strategy is based on
four guiding principles:
1. Strengthening maritime governance and the rule of law;
2. Inter-agency cooperation;
3. Multilateral maritime cooperation;
4. Strengthening maritime safety to optimize the “Blue Economy”.
In line with these four guiding principles, three (3) General Strategic Objective were
defined:
1. - Strengthen Maritime Governance
2. - Optimizing the Blue Economy
3. - Strengthen Maritime Safety and Security
First steps have been taken in the materialization of this strategy, mainly in the area of
training of staff, in practice, of the operational of the Coast Guard. However, the
indication that still exists in the understanding of the importance of the sea, as well as
the absence of a true introduction and appropriation of maritime governance that is not
only expressed on paper or strategic documents, but in practical terms, has
compromised the implementation of the desired goal. The Maritime Security Strategy
was made with the competition of international partners.
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CHAPTER FOUR – IMPACT OF MARITIME INSECURITY ON 2030
TRANSFORMATION AGENDA OF STP
Chapter four assesses the relevance of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, the
economic and social development challenges, and the relevance of the sea to STP’s
economy.

4.1 Major lines of 2030 transformation agenda of STP
The strategic policy document for STP is the 2030 Transformation Agenda, which is
based on the vision of the country contained in "São Tomé and Príncipe 2030: the
country that we must build"(Government, 2015). In these documents, the government
determined its development priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).
The Agenda focuses on nine thematic and legitimate aspirations of citizens, linked to
the four transversal themes: rule of law, democracy, sustainable growth and human
development. The Transformation Agenda seeks to lay the groundwork for the
country's transition through two main initiatives to be carried out in line with the
Public-Private Partnership Agreement and a priority plan for public investment. Such
projects and programs need to pave the way for a new competitive private national and
foreign initiatives, economic ownership, particularly in the tourism, logistics, port and
airport sectors, high value-added agricultural, fisheries, and related economic sea
activities (Government, 2015).
As it can be seen in this strategic document, special attention was given to the
construction of a deep-water transhipping port and a high-performance international
airport throughout the country, which will become a functional centre for logistics
services in the sub-region of the GoG.
Sao-Tomean authorities are conscious that vision and its initial implementation plan
face many risks, associated to the resources mobilization for development (W. B.
Group, 2018). In addition, today the maritime insecurity in the GoG can compromise
some inspiration due to the vital dependence that the country has on the sea and on
foreign aid.
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4.2 Challenges facing the economy and social development
Small islands states face serious challenges to development which is a critical
constraint. Small island states face numerous systemic challenges related to their
geography and population size. For example, the small size of the labour force can
prevent economies of scale from forming labour-intensive sectors, while limiting the
possibility of diversification and contributing to dependence on imports. Likewise, a
small area of land can restrict production possibilities, especially in the agricultural
sector. Geographical distance tends to increase marketing costs, aggravating the
challenges of a small domestic market. In addition, the high unit costs of public goods
(including public administration), combined with a small tax base, can lead to fiscal
imbalances. Many of these factors also interact with each other, exacerbating their
impact on economic development (W. B. Group, 2018).
Sao Tome and Principe will continue to face significant challenges to utilize its
insularity for its own benefit, small market size, vulnerability to natural shocks and
climate change, limited human capital and scarce marketable resources to generate
inclusive sustainable growth and reduce poverty.

4.3 Relevance of the sea in the STP economy
A microstate with 1,001 km of land, but with an EEZ of 160,000 km2, STP has an
immense potential to diversify its economy through the sea. Given the limited land
surface, the country realizes that promoting its economic development would
inevitably and obviously entail the efficient utilization of resources. These are
provided by the vast maritime extension and its privileged geographical position in the
GoG, which is why a Blue Planning and Finance and Blue Economy ministry was
established deliberately to lead the process of economic transformation with a view to
that enhancing the utilization of the sea resources.
Despite the potential for economic development that the sea can offer STP's economy
(oil exploration, fishing, logistics and port services) is still not being used efficiently.
However, today STP's economy is already largely dependent on maritime connections
to supply its market with consumer and investment goods because of its situation of
insularity(ANSTP, 2020). The bulk of overseas trade (import and export) is actually
conducted by sea. According to 2017 National Port Administration Company
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(ENAPORT) statistics, about 120,189.1 tons of goods passed through the port (loading
and unloading) (ENAPORT, 2018), while at air transport level only 196,575 kg of
cargo was transported, according to National Institute of Civil Aviation (INAC)
statistics(INAC, 2018). The overall freight carried by air is just 0.2% of the freight
carried by sea. In the face of low productive potential, STP is a market economy very
open to the outside in terms of imports. In other words, the country imports the
necessities of consumer and investment products, and exports commodity services,
with a greater focus on cocoa and, more recently, palm oil (BUSINESS, 2020).
However, the quantity exported is much smaller than the quantity imported, thus
presenting a historically deficient balance of trade(ANSTP, 2020).
According to National Institute of Statistics (INE) data, exports in 2017 represented
about 7% of total imports. The little diversification of the economy, likewise, makes
the trade have significant weight in the GDP. In fact, from the data published by INE
in its São Tomé and Príncipe in Number 2017 report, it was found that trade had a
weight on GDP of around 26.75% (INE, 2017). Indeed, the real importance of the sea
in the economic development of this nation is undeniable. These numbers also show
the great import dependence for supplying its economy with basic necessities and
investment; thus, any and all disturbances that might hinder the normal transit of these
goods by sea and at acceptable costs could jeopardize the economic and social stability
of the country.
Besides its importance in the present and, in the future, the sea could also be at the
core of the latest strategic target for STP’s economic diversification. The Country
Economic Memorandum for São Tomé and Príncipe, prepared by the World Bank on
pages 46 and 47, points to the blue economy, with the country's marine resources and
geostrategic location in the GoG, if properly explored, as sources of great potential for
generating benefits for the STP economy (W. B. Group, 2018).
The country's biggest private bank, International Bank of Sao Tome and Principe
(BISTP), through a publication published in BP Magazine on 9 January 2020 in a
message calling for investment in STP, highlighted, among other factors, political
stability and social peace as factors relevant to the country's competitiveness vis-à-vis
other African countries. Furthermore, its privileged geostrategic position, literally at
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the centre of the world, two hours flight from a group of countries rich in natural
resources, located on the African coast and representing a market of about 300 million
consumers was also emphasized (BUSINESS, 2020). Continued peacekeeping,
converted into the security of people and goods, is essential for this small economy
now and in the future in a world of great uncertainty and turmoil, on land as well as at
sea.

34

CHAPTER FIVE - CORRELATION BETWEEN MARITIME (IN)SECURITY
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND MARITIME SECURITY IN SAO TOME
AND PRINCIPE
Chapter five assesses the potential impact of maritime insecurity on 2030
transformation agenda of STP, through the research findings and the correlation
between maritime insecurity in the GoG and maritime security in STP.
The correlation between the maritime insecurity in the GoG and maritime security in
Sao Tome and Principe, including its impact on the 2030 transformation agenda, is
based on data from the survey conducted, anchored on three (3) pivotal pillars
including:
1. Maritime insecurity threats to the GoG;
2. How these threats affect the implementation 2030 agenda; and
3. Mitigation Strategy.
For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent to twenty-three (23) respondents, while out
of this total, the author received fifteen (15) responses to the questionnaire.
Furthermore, taking into account the problem that was proposed to be addressed, the
questionnaire targeted, participants from different institutions and individuals such as:
1. Prosecution Service;
2. Ministry of Defense and Internal Order;
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and Communities;
4. Ministry of Finance and Blue Economy;
5. Coast Guard;
6. National Police;
7. Maritime and Port Institute;
8. Individuals who held leadership positions at the level of government
and public and private institutions.
It is essential to underline that there were only 23 respondents because they were the
most suitable people to respond, taking into account the specificity of the topic and the
need to collect more accurate information.
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5.1 Findings / Analysis
5.1.1 Maritime insecurity threats to the Gulf of Guinea
The study identified Piracy and Armed Robbery, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing, and theft of oil and other cargos as the three major maritime security threats
in GoG, as illustrated in Figure 5. Additionally, trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and
counterfeit items were also identified as threats to maritime security in the region.

15%

2% 6%
0%

25%
21%

8%

23%

No answer
Piracy and armed robbery
Illegal unreported and unregulated fishing
Arms trafficking
Theft of oil and other cargo
Drug trafficking
Trafficking of counterfeit items
Human trafficking

Figure 5: The major security threats in the Gulf of Guinea
From the findings, 25% of respondents, indicated piracy and armed robbery as the
major security threats in the GoG. Majority of the respondents also revealed that it is
carried out using speedboats by the local gangs that are operating from the coast
attacking or supported by a mother ship to hijack ships. Other approaches used include
a group of people armed in a small vessel, carrying firearms, machetes and other
sophisticated navigation equipment (15%), use of unflagged vessel or pirogue and
taking crews hostage to ask for a rescue (10%) as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Piracy carried out in the Gulf of Guinea
The study also investigated the persons involved in piracy which revealed that piracy
is majorly executed by organized groups (28%) and those that are unemployed (17%),
mercenaries (5%), fishermen or former fishermen (11%), terrorists (11%), and persons
from the public administration (11%) as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Who are involved in Piracy and armed robbery?
Further investigation into to the drivers of these maritime insecurity threats revealed
that poverty (34%) is the first driver, then quick profit (15%) as the second and poor
governance (11%) as the third variable that drives these people to join the criminal
activities. The result of this study also indicated other drivers, including; registered
unemployment, social injustice as well as political economic and social instability as
the potential driver (see Figure 8).
Unemployment
8%
Quick profit
15%
Political, economic
and social
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8%

No answer
11%

Social injustice
8%
Corruption
4%
Poor governance
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Poverty
35%
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Social injustice

Corruption

Poor governance

Poverty

Political, economic and social instability

Quick profit

Unemployment

Figure 8: What drives people to join these criminal activities?
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5.1.2 How maritime security threat can affect the implementation of the 2030
Agenda
The study also sought to reveal the major economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and
Principe. As can be seen in Figure 9 and 10, decreased ability to obtain wealth through
natural resources, weak economic growth, higher product price for final consumer,
more isolation (limited interest in navigational connections), increase in the cost of
shipping, increase in the price of imported food products and investments inhibition,
are the main economic impacts of piracy. Nevertheless, 22% of respondents
highlighted the higher product price for final consumers and weak economic growth
as a result of the combination of all the factors mentioned earlier. The findings as well
indicated decreased ability to obtain wealth, increase in the price of imported food,
increase of the cost of shipping and more isolation as the moderate impact and finally
the investment inhibition as the least impact.

Chart Title
Investiment inhibition
Increase in the price of imported food products
Increase in the cost of shipping
More isolation (limited interest in navigational
connections)
Higher product price for final consumer
Weak economic growth
Decreased ability to obtain wealth through natural
resources
No answer
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Figure 9: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe

39

7

8

No answer
Decreased ability to obtain wealth
through natural resources
Weak economic growth

10% 3% 10%
13%

10%

Higher product price for final
consumer
More isolation (limited interest in
navigational connections)
Increase in the cost of shipping

10%
22%
22%

Increase in the price of imported
food products
Investiment inhibition

Figure 10: The main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe
In the same line, the study investigated how these threats can affect the stakeholders
involved in import and export and other maritime services. The study revealed limited
services/business, less investment and increase of insurance premiums as an effect of
the threat on the stakeholders. Other respondents pointed out the bankruptcy of
companies linked to the sector as can be seen in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: How can threat affect the Stakeholders involved in import and export
and other maritime services
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The study also revealed that most (50%) of respondents who took part in the survey
indicated that the government has limited resource to handle the threats. Only a small
fraction (17%) of the respondents indicated that the government has insufficient
resources, while 33% of the respondents did not respond to the question, as shown in
Figure 12.

Lacks resources
17%
No answer
33%

Limited
resouces
50%

Figure 12: The government capabilities to handle the threat
5.1.3 Mitigation Strategy
Given the possible economic impact, the study also considered the mitigation
strategies put in place. As can be seen in Figure 13, 14% of the respondents indicated
that despite the difficulties, the regulation has a good implementation. However, 29%
of the respondents pointed out that the regulation is poorly implemented while 14%
considered that is not implemented. It is important to considerer that 43% of the
respondents did not answer this question. While the country has a legal structure with
provisions that timidly address this problem, the level of implementation of these
provisions is still low, a fact due to several reasons, one of which is the lack of
financial, technical and operational means.
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Figure 13: How is this regulation being implemented
The study showed that when it comes to measuring whether the country has the
resources for countermeasures and maritime domain responses, the respondents are
divided. As demonstrated in Figure 14, 42% of the respondents indicated that the
country has no resources although 25 % revealed that the country has resources but
not sufficient for countermeasures and maritime domain answers.
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No answer
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Figure 14: Does the country have enough resources for countermeasures and
maritime domain answers?
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The study also sought to reveal if STP has the resources required, personnel and
training to face the maritime security threats. Among the respondents, 18% indicated
that the country has the required personnel and training, while 41% of the respondents
indicated that the personnel and training are not enough. Furthermore, it is essential to
note that 18% of the respondents mentioned that the country does not have the required
personnel and training as can be observed in Figure 15.
No answer
23%
Not enough
41%

Yes
18%

No
18%

Figure 15: Does the country have the resources required personnel and training?
The study also investigated the perception of military cooperation in place in STP in
maritime security. Overall, the respondents have a favourable opinion on the military
cooperation in place in this country; however, 19% of the respondents gave positive
feedback but consider that there is a clear need for adjustment and a need for a strong
commitment from the STP authority.
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Figure 16: Opinion about military cooperation in place in this domain

5.2 Discussion
Overall this study corroborates the findings from the previous studies in maritime
insecurity in GoG, and brings a novel knowledge on how this threats can affect a large
ocean state (Chan, 2018) in this case, Sao Tome and Principe.
The present findings seem to be consistent with other research that indicated that
maritime security threats have many faces, of which piracy and armed robbery
(Anyimadu, 2013; Feldt et al., 2013) hold all the critical attention when it is come to
assessing the threats at sea in the GoG (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). As presented in
Figure 5, 25% of the respondents indicated that piracy and armed robbery represent
one of the major security threats in the GoG, the rest of the percentages being
fragmented among the remaining threats as shown in Figure 5.
Similarly, these results are consistent with findings of other studies like (ICS, BIMCO,
IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, 2020) about the modus operandi, which indicate that
the pirates operate in small armed groups, using speedboats or pirogues which are
sometimes supported by mother ships, when operating in a much large area to the
specific target.
These findings also agree with Lindskov Jacobsen and Riber Nordby’s work, which
underlines that pirates are not born at sea (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015). Onshore issues
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such as poverty and quick profits or easy way to obtaining money quickly, and poor
governance are the major motivations that drive people including fishermen or former
fishermen, persons from the public administration, and other registered unemployed
to engage in these criminal activities.
The data above shows that despite the studies being done since 2011 and numerous
efforts to counter rising crime at sea in GoG since 2013, these threats are still eminent
in the region, the current mitigation strategies have been ineffective or are poorly
implemented hence the failure to successfully resolve these threats. This shows that
there is a dire need to review, develop or enforce better maritime insecurity mitigation
strategies in GoG. Therefore, this calls for a holistic and realistic approach in the
improvement of current strategy, that factors in the underlying economic and social
drivers of maritime insecurity threat in GoG. Additionally, there is need for strategies
that take into consideration the advanced, dynamics and the modus operandi of the
criminal which is in constant metamorphosis coupled with fast and modern
technologies as well as operational resources. For instance, if onshore issues such as
poverty are not well the addressed, based on the findings of this study, they could lead
to an increase in more people engaging in criminal activities. Further, poor allocation
of rapid and modern resource for the Navy or Coast Guard such as modern speedboats,
improve communication technologies could hinder the effectiveness of the coast
guards to counter the advanced, technologies and the modus operandi of the criminals
in GoG.
In the same line, the findings show in Figures 9 and 10 that a link exists between the
going on of maritime insecurity in the region particularly in the waters of STP and the
impact on the economy. This is due to the fact that STP is a market economy very
dependent when it comes to importing, i.e. the country imports the basics of consumer
and investment products, and export services. Furthermore, the quantity produced is
much smaller than the quantity imported, thereby, creating a historically poor balance
of trade. However, with the flourishing piracy, this situation will worsen considerably.
As indicated by the World Bank Group (W. B. Group, 2018), STP appears as a fragile
economy in the GoG region, and is highly dependent on foreign assistance, and
vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, the present findings (see Figure 10) seem to be
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consistent with the sentence above taking into account that threats can negatively
affect the stakeholders involved in import and export and other maritime services,
generating less investments, limited service/business, less attractive as location,
change the markets, increase in insurance premiums, and occasional bankruptcy of
companies linked to the sector. As informed in chapter four, paragraph 4.1, STP has a
Transformation Agenda that aims to harness the revenues from its sea. The study
revealed that high number of maritime security threats in the GoG region could further
negatively affect or slow the implementation of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of
STP, specifically relating to the economic growth project of the maritime sectors. This
is because piracy and illegal fishing, in particular, can affect the entire production and
transport chain that depends on this means of maritime transport as demonstrated
earlier in Figure 9.
The findings also show that with a devastating effect on the economy, maritime
insecurity in the waters of STP, as well as its neighbours, can contribute to the increase
in the cost of maritime transport and, increase in the insurance premium of ships that
go to STP. This will consequently have repercussions on the final consumer who will
purchase the products at the highest price. Furthermore, the increase in prices for the
final consumer, in turn, can therefore generate discontent among the population, which
at their most expensive level of life, and leave them more vulnerable to the promoters
of criminal activity in search of a new member.
The implications of these threats are not just limited to the economy. Therefore, with
the need to reinforce tourism, one of the respondents indicated that in the worst
scenario, there is a potential risk that criminal groups (pirates) will access the coast of
STP, where there are resorts, facing the vulnerability of the coast and the limited
resources to assure security. In this context, the main impact is undoubtedly on, poor
mobility of people, goods and services as limited commercial transactions provide for
the weak economic growth resulting from these capacities, with a real impact on
structuring projects linked to the blue economy
However, this study also demonstrated that there is a need for reviewing legal
instruments. There are many gaps between them that undermine the coexistence and
coordination between the different bodies, affecting their efficiency and, consequently,
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their response capacity. In general, the response capacity is very feeble from human,
technical, logistical and operational resources. Therefore, the resources available to
the country, as well as countermeasures and responses in the field of maritime security,
are not sufficient. However, despite the weakness in naval and human resources to
tackle these crimes, STP looks and bets on bilateral and multilateral cooperation to
mitigate these threats and to guarantee state authority at sea.
Therefore, Portugal and STP signed a Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Joint
Inspection of Maritime Spaces under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of STP. As a result
of this agreement the presence of a warship of the Portuguese Republic called
NRP/Zaire was obtained and placed in its waters with a permanence for approximately
two years by Portuguese and São Tomean contingents. Besides, the Obangame
Express Exercise takes place annually in the waters of STP jurisdiction, which aims to
improve communications, information exchange and interoperability between the
media of the various countries with interests in the GoG and on the maritime routes
that traverse this region.
The participation of the different entities of STP in this exercise ensures that the
procedures, means and human resources are developed and exercised, allowing to
increase maritime security in the jurisdictional waters of STP and the GoG.
Although, the study calls once again to a look for the poor allocation of rapid and
modern resource for the Coast Guard of STP. Despite the dissuasive effect that the
NRP/Zaire have in the STP EEZ as well as in the GoG region, the warship is 48 years,
and STP don’t have a better vessel to control its waters, as well as the security of
sensitive infrastructure for development. Therefore, if the government don’t commit
to allocate appropriate modern speedboats, improve communication technologies to
hinder the effectiveness of the coast guards to counter the advanced technologies and
the modus operandi of the criminals at sea, the infrastructure for development liked
and depend of sea will jeopardise, as well the 2030 Transformation Agenda
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
6.1 Conclusion
This study aimed to assess the impact of maritime (in)security in the Gulf of Guinea
with special emphasis on Sao Tome and Principe. Specifically, the study evaluated the
status quo of maritime insecurity in GoG and STP followed by an identification of the
key maritime security threats in the GoG and STP and their drivers. Further, the study
established a positive correlation between maritime insecurity in GoG and maritime
security in STP. Additionally, an assessment of the potential impact of the maritime
insecurity on the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP was conducted. Further, the
study reviewed the current maritime insecurity mitigation strategies in GoG and STP,
with a special focus on their strengths and weaknesses. Last but certainly not least the
study identified potential improvements to the current maritime insecurity mitigation
strategies in GoG and STP.
In depth, based on the findings of this research the author concludes the following:
Currently, the GoG is challenged by a complex and dynamic range of maritime
insecurity threats, linked with an increasing number of attacks to vessels at sea. Piracy
and armed robbery is the major threat which affects shipping activities and hence lead
to onshore socio-economic challenges such as poverty, which in turn influences more
people to be involved in this offshore criminal activities, thereby creating a vicious
cycle.
Furthermore, maritime insecurity, particularly piracy and armed robbery, are great
potential threats to the implementation of the 2030 Transformation Agenda of STP, a
strategic policy document aimed at developing STP as a hub of tourism and also
includes a plan for construction of a deep-water transhipping port, which is aimed to
be a centre for logistic services for the region. As a consequence of the country
location, near the epicentre of major attacks in the region, as well the limited resources
to respond, there is a high dependence on imports. Therefore, the consumers and
investment products will have an economic and social impact, on the final consumers.
Although STP is facing this situation, it has a maritime security strategy. However, the
implementation of the strategy is faced with barriers, such as limited resources,
political agenda, harmonizing and enhancing the existing national instruments and
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establishing a robust interagency coordination mechanism, weak authority
commitment despite the remarkable effort achieved through regional and international
cooperation. The regional and international cooperation seems to be a partway to
assure maritime security in a large ocean state as STP, even though the complex and
dynamic range of maritime insecurity is a challenge.
6.2 Recommendation
To address the range of issues in maritime insecurity and break the vicious circle that
affects maritime security in the region, in particular in STP, the author proposes the
following recommendations:
6.2.1 At the international and regional level
Sharing information and improvement neighbourhood patrol
Maritime insecurity is a serious threat in the region and is a major concern for countries
in the GoG. However, the fight against these threats cannot be done in an isolated and
uncoordinated way. The countries in the region should improve their capabilities and
effectiveness by sharing information promptly in order to combat maritime insecurity
in national or regional waters. The countries in the region should also improve regional
patrols by effective collaboration and cooperation to minimise the threats of maritime
insecurity in the GoG.

6.2.2 At the national level
1. Regulations

Although the country has a legal structure with provisions that timidly address the
maritime security issues, the level of implementation of these provisions is still low.
Furthermore, the study pointed out that regulation is poorly implemented. To address
these issues, the legal normative framework should be revised and harmonised in line
with the maritime security strategy as well as the reality of the country and the best
practice in the region to address the problem. In parallel with the harmonization of the
legal framework, the government should provide training for magistrates and law
enforcement officers, as well as for all officials who work in the field of maritime
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security. This will enable STP to resolve the issue of dispersed laws, to better
determine its jurisdiction, eliminating shocks of competence and responsibilities
between the authorities, to be in line with international conventions and to have a
robust and dissuasive legal framework, thus well-trained staff prepared to response the
dynamics of crime both on land and at sea.
Most importantly, it will serve as a basis for accommodating, promoting transparency
and accountability in public affairs, the infrastructure to support growth programs and
the simplification of legislation/business environment included in the 2030
transformation agenda of Sao Tome and Principe.

2. Improvement of the well-being

This study showed that poverty is a key driver of piracy and armed robbery among
other maritime insecurity challenges. Therefore, the author recommends that the
government of STP should device strong strategies to financially empower its citizens,
especially in the coastal area. Specifically, the government should increase
employment opportunities and/or create conditions that support entrepreneurship and
self-employment, as a way to alleviate poverty which has been shown to influence
people to participate in criminal activities at sea. These efforts are vital to generate the
revenue for all, in particular for vulnerable fractions of the population such as the
coastal communities, thus decrease their vulnerability to join the criminal activity at
sea. Additionally, this will achieve poverty reduction in rural and coastal regions and
promotion of youth employment, which are the objectives of the 2030 Transformation
Agenda of Sao Tome and Principe, and in line with the United Nation Sustainable
Development Goals (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

3. Financial resources

The study showed that the personnel and training are inadequate as well as limited
financial resources. Limited financial resource allocation in the Coast Guard has also
been shown to hinder successful mitigation of maritime insecurity in STP. The
government should, therefore, allocate more resources to ensure that Coast Guard have
enough resources to respond to maritime security threats. Additionally, capacity
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building efforts should be increased to improve the level of reaction and promote
capacity building for personnel at all levels to ensure proper implementation and
enforcement of the maritime security strategy. Further, a proactive approach should be
incorporated in the training.
These efforts are vital in improving the vigilance and capability of the Coast Guard. It
also will serve as the basis for accommodating the growth support infrastructure
included in the 2030 Transformation Agenda of São Tomé and Principe.

4. Interagency coordination mechanism

The study revealed that inadequate communication persists between the agencies that
have maritime security related mandates. A robust interagency coordination
mechanism should be established to set clear lines of responsibilities and ensure the
sound implementation and enforcement of the maritime security strategies by the
relevant state agencies. Additionally, the government should create conditions and
encourage the sharing of information between agencies which will be the support to
effective implementation of maritime security strategy and a pathway to well enforce
the regulation.

5. International and regional cooperation

São Tomé and Príncipe has the most comprehensive exclusive EEZ in the GoG of,
about 160,000 km2, which corresponds to about 160 times its land area. However, its
limited financial and operational resources compromise an effective patrol and control
of its waters. The study also showed a positive perception of international and regional,
cooperation, particularly the military cooperation in place in STP. However, the study
also revealed a clear need for adjustment and a need for a strong commitment from the
STP authority. The STP authority should improve the international and regional
cooperation in place and attract more attention by proposing to accommodate and
coordinate a regional program of maritime security due to its location. This will
reinforce the surveillance of the waters, improve the cooperation and place the country
on the international agenda as a hub of a regional program of maritime security, and
drive the implementation of the maritime security strategy.

51

References
Abdel Fattah, M. (2017). Piracy in Gulf of Guinea causes, efforts and solutions. Vol.
35(February), 12–21.
Adejimi Osinowo, A. (2015). O Combate À Pirataria No Golfo Da Guiné.
Alegre, M.-C. C. (2009). TOWARDS A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IN SAO TOME
AND PRINCIPE.
Ali, & Tsamenyi. (2013). Fault lines in maritime security: Analysis of maritime
boundary uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea. African Security Review, 22(3),
95–110. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2013.815118
ANSTP. (2020). Lei n.o 01/2020 - Orçamento Geral do Estado para o ano
economico de 2020. São Tomé e Príncipe.
Anyimadu, A. (2013). Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea : Lessons Learned
from the Indian Ocean. 44(0), 0–19.
Barrios, C. (2013). Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Offshore and onshore.
May, 1–4.
Boateng, & Jiping. (2020). A Pestle Analysis of Maritime Piracy and Maritime
Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal,
7(1), 472–482. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.71.7742
Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005
BUSINESS. (2020). Banco Internacional de S. Tomé e Príncipe (BISTP): Um
desafio ao investimento e instalação de empresas portuguesas num mercado
com potencial - Revista Business Portugal.
http://revistabusinessportugal.pt/banco-internacional-de-s-tome-e-principebistp-um-desafio-ao-investimento-e-instalacao-de-empresas-portuguesas-nummercado-com-potencial/
Chan, N. (2018). “large ocean states”: Sovereignty, small islands, and marine
protected areas in global oceans governance. Global Governance, 24(4), 537–
555. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02404005
Economist, T. (2015). Portugal supports maritime surveillance in São Tomé.
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1933015177&Country=S%25C3%
25A3o%2520Tom%25C3%25A9%2520and%2520Pr%25_5
ENAPORT. (2018). Boletim Estatistico Empresa Nacional de administração dos
Portos “ENAPORT.” 1, 1–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004
EU. (2018). EU Maritime Security Factsheet: The Gulf of Guinea - European

52

External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en
Feldt, L., Roell, P., & Thiele, R. D. (2013). ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on
Defense and International Security Maritime Security-Perspectives for a
Comprehensive Approach Maritime Security-Perspectives for a Comprehensive
Approach. http://www.ispsw.de
Fiorelli, M. (2014). PIRACY IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE GULF OF GUINEA.
FMI. (2018). RELATÓRIO DO CORPO TÉCNICO SOBRE A CONSULTA DE 2018
AO ABRIGO DO ARTIGO IV, QUINTA AVALIAÇÃO NO ÂMBITO DA
FACILIDADE DE CRÉDITO ALARGADO, PEDIDO DE DISPENSA PELA
NÃO OBSERVÂNCIA DE CRITÉRIOS DE DESEMPENHO E AVALIAÇÃO
DAS GARANTIAS DE FINANCIAMENTO — COMUN. 26.
Forum, W. E. (2019). West Africa is becoming the world’s piracy capital. Here’s
how to tackle the problem. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/westafrica-is-becoming-the-world-s-piracy-capital-here-s-how-to-tackle-theproblem/
Francis Abiodun, T., & Mohammed Yakubu Dahiru, C. (2020). MARITIME
INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA (GoG) AND THE QUEST FOR
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE DEPLOYMENT IN COMBATING THE
MENACE. In International Journal of Advanced Academic Research | Social
and Management Sciences| (Vol. 6, Issue 4).
Género, E. G. (2012). ANÁLISE DA ESTRATÉGIA DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA
UNIÃO AFRICANA: - UMA ABORDAGEM GEO-SOCIAL APLICADA A SÃO
TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE.
GMSC. (2019). Concept note - Global Maritime Security Conference - Global
Maritime Security Conference. https://globalmaritimesecurityconf.com/conceptnote/
González, Y. S. (2016). the Gulf of Guinea : the Future African Persian Gulf ?
March 2007, 85–105.
Government. (2015). 2030 TRANSFORMATION AGENDA SÃO TOME AND
PRINCIPE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERS.
Governo. (2018). Decreto Lei n.o 02/2018 Aprova a Estratégia de Segurança
Marítima.
Group, I. C. (2012). The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone. Crisis Group Africa
Report N°195, 12 December 2012 Page. December.
Group, W. B. (2018). MEMORANDO ECONÓMICO DO PAÍS para São Tomé e
Príncipe DO PAÍS para São Tomé e Príncipe.

53

Harbo, R. (n.d.). G u l f o f A l a s k a. Cm, 135.
Hastings, J. V, Phillips, S. G., Ali, M. A., Mcdonald, A., Nyambura, S., & Percival,
J. (2015). MARITIME PIRACY BUSINESS NETWORKS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA Thanks to. African Affairs, 114, 555–576.
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adv040
House, C. (2013). Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.London: The Royal
Institute of International Affairs. www.chathamhouse.org
ICC-IMB. (2019). ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU PIRACY AND
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS. January 2020.
ICC-IMB. (2020). ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report-First
Quarter 2020 ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU PIRACY AND
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 January
– 31 March 2020. www.icc-ccs.org
ICC. (2020). ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS.
ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, I. and O. (2020). Best Management
Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast of West
Africa including the Gulf of Guinea BMP West Africa.
ICS. (2020). International Chamber of Shipping - Shipping and World Trade.
https://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade
IDN. (2020). Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building Instituto da Defesa
Nacional no 38.
Ifesinachi, K.; Nwangwu, C. (2015). Implementation of the Yaounde Code of
Conduct and Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Research on
Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(21), 54–64.
IMO. (2017). Implementing sustainable maritime security measures in West and
Central Africa. January, 0–16.
INAC. (2018). Anuário do Transporte Aéreo Regular – 2016/2017 Instituto Nacional
de Aviação Civil São Tomé e Príncipe. 1–24.
http://www.inac.st/images/phocadownload/Teste/EstatÃ-sitca-2016-2017.pdf
INE. (2020). Instituto Nacional de Estatística - Número da População em 2020.
https://www.ine.st/
INE, I. N. de E. (2017). São Tomé e Príncipe em Números 2017 - São Tomé et
Príncipe en Chifres 2017. 37.
International, P. (2020). GULF OF GUINEA – General Cargo Attacked 80NM NW
of Sao Tomé February 14th, 2020 - Praesidium.

54

ITLOS. (2017). Press Release DISPUTE CONCERNING DELIMITATION OF
THE MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN GHANA AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE
SPECIAL CHAMBER DELIVERS ITS JUDGMENT ON 23 SEPTEMBER
2017 At. International Legal Materials, 25(2), 251–307.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020782900025110
IUMI. (2020). Best management practice West Africa / IUMI Eye Newsletter June
2020. https://iumi.com/news/iumi-eye-newsletter-june-2020/best-managementpractice-west-africa
Jacobsen, K. L. (2017). Maritime security and capacity building in the Gulf of
Guinea: On comprehensiveness, gaps, and security priorities. African Security
Review, 26(3), 237–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2017.1291441
Jacobsen, & Nordby. (2015). MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA.
Kamal-Deen, A. (2015). Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea:
Prospects and Challenges.
Kuppen, J. (2016). General Assembly 1 Measures to eradicate piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea. March 2016.
Legal, U. N.-O. of. (2018). Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime
Delimitation - SAO TOME& PRINCIPE.
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/
STP.htm
Lopez-Lucia, E. (2015). Fragility, Violence and Criminality in the Gulf of Guinea
Key websites Suggested citation About GSDRC.
Luntumbue, M. (2011). Piraterie et insécurité dans le golfe de Guinée : défis et
enjeux d’une gouvernance maritime régionale (Note d’Analyse). www.grip.orgcourriel:admi@grip.orgURL:http://www.grip.org/fr/siteweb/images/NOTES_A
NALYSE/2011/NA_2011-09-30_FR_M-LUNTUMBUE.pdfwww.grip.orgCourriel:admi@grip.org
Mañe, D. O. (2005). Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy:
Prospects and Challenges; Damian Ondo Mañe; IMF Working Paper 05/235;
December 1, 2005.
Morais, M. (2018). Estratégia Nacional de Prevenção e Luta contra o
Branqueamento de Capitais e Financiamento do Terrorismo.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/policies/fight-against-terrorism/fightagainst-terrorist-financing/
MVOMO, U. &. (2013). African Approaches to Maritime Security - The Gulf of
Guinea About.
Nacional, A. (2019). Lei n.o 01/2020, O ORÇAMENTO GERAL DO ESTADO PARA
O ANO ECONÓMICO DE 2020. 12.

55

Nascimento, A. (2011). São Tomé e Príncipe e os desafios da segurança marítima no
Golfo da Guiné. Nação e Defesa, 93–121.
Nnamdi K. Obasi. (2011). Fuelling the world - failing the region? : Oil governance
and development in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea. www.fes-westafrica.org
Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2018). Pollution, Fisheries and Food (In)Security in the Gulf of
Guinea. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3117284
Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019a). Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the
complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the
Gulf of Guinea.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X17303445
Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019b). Nigeria in the context of illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea : human and national security
dimensions of maritime security.
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/nigeria-in-the-context-of-illegalunreported-and-unregulated-fishing-in-the-gulf-of-guinea(560005e3-be4a-4215a68c-7f893a752c11).html
Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019c). Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the
complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the
Gulf of Guinea. Marine Policy, 99, 414–422.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.016
Onuoha, F. C. (2013). Piracy and maritime security in the gulf of guinea: Trends,
concerns, and propositions. Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 4(3), 267–
293. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2013.862767
Pigeon, I. O.-Y. & M. (2020). GULF OF GUINEA STABLE SEAS : STABLE SEAS :
PNUD. (2020). Impacto da Pandemia de Covid-19 em São Tomé e Príncipe Análise
Sócio-Económica Rápida.
Portugal, G. (2018). «Novo patamar» na cooperação entre Portugal e São Tomé e
Príncipe no domínio da defesa - XXI Governo - República Portuguesa.
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc21/comunicacao/noticia?i=novo-patamar-nacooperacao-entre-portugal-e-sao-tome-e-principe-no-dominio-da-defesa
Ribeiro, A. S. (2019). O NRP “Zaire” e a segurança marítima de São Tomé e
Príncipe | Opinião | PÚBLICO.
https://www.publico.pt/2019/12/27/politica/opiniao/nrp-zaire-segurancamaritima-sao-tome-principe-1898366
Ribeiro, M. (2020). AVALIAÇÃO DO QUADRO LEGAL DE SÃO TOMÉ E
PRÍNCIPE. Análise global do sistema jurídico atual aplicável ao combate ao
crime no mar. RELATÓRIO PRELIMINAR.
Rohwerder, B., & Steffen, D. (2016). Piracy in the Horn of Africa, West Africa

56

Rapid Literature Review About GSDRC. www.gsdrc.org
Shuo, M. (2019). MARITIME ECONOMICS.
TélaNón. (2018a). Brasil especializa fuzileiros navais e pretende avançar para o
exército. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/11/21/28212/brasil-especializafuzileiros-navais-e-pretende-avancar-para-o-exercito/
TélaNón. (2018b). Portugal e STP abrem nova etapa na cooperação militar.
https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/02/09/26393/portugal-e-stp-abrem-novaetapa-na-cooperacao-militar/
Thiago Melo. (2014). A pirataria ameaça São Tomé e Príncipe.
https://www.dw.com/pt-002/a-pirataria-ameaça-são-tomé-e-príncipe/a17838153
U.S. Navy. (2006). Naval Operations Concept 2006. 112.
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf?
Ukeje, C. (2015). The Abuja Declaration and the challenge of implementing a
maritime security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea and the South Atlantic. Journal
of the Indian Ocean Region, 11(2), 220–235.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2015.1074784
UNION, C. O. T. E. (2014). EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Council meeting Brussels, 17 March 2014.
Veiga, A. (2013). Portugal ajuda São Tomé e Príncipe a vigiar e fiscalizar a sua
ZEE. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2013/06/18/13551/portugal-ajuda-saotome-e-pincipe-a-vigiar-e-fiscalizar-a-sua-zee/
Veiga, A. (2020). Portugal prevê para breve a retirada do navio Zaire de
circulação. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2020/02/18/31188/portugal-prevepara-breve-a-retirada-do-navio-zaire-de-circulacao/
VOA. (2010). Radares Americanos no Golfo da Guiné.
https://www.voaportugues.com/a/a-38-2008-02-07-voa892516299/1258186.html
Weltzen, & Alegre, M.-C. C. P. Van. (2017). THE LAW OF THE SEA - The African
Union and its Member States - Sao Tome and Principe.

57

Appendices
Appendix A: Consent form for respondent

Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in
connection with a Dissertation which will be written by me the interviewer, in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime Affairs
at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.
The topic of the Dissertation is AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF
MARITIME (IN)SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA. (SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE).
The information provided to me in this questionnaire will be used for research
purposes and the results will form part of a dissertation, which will be published online
and made available to the public. Your personal information will not be published.
You may withdraw from the research at any time, and your personal data will be
immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World
Maritime University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree
is awarded.
Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.
Student’s name
Specialization
Email address

Paulo de Araújo Ribeiro de Ceita
Maritime Law & Policy
w1903605@wmu.se

***
I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand
that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest
confidence, and will be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.
Name:

………………………………………………………………………

Signature:

………………………………………………………………………

Date:

………………………………………………………………………
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Appendix B: Survey of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea & its impact in
Sao Tome and Principe
OBJECTIVE ONE: TO IDENTIFY THE MARITIME INSECURITY
THREATS TO THE GULF OF GUINEA
1.

Q1 - What are the major security threats in the Gulf of Guinea?

2.

Q1 - Quais são as principais ameaças à segurança maritima no Golfo da
Guiné?

3.

Q2 - Rank the threats in order of prevalence
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4.

Q2 – Numere as ameaças por ordem de prevalência

5.

Q3 - How is piracy carried out in the Gulf of Guinea?

6.

Q3 - Como é realizada a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné?

7.

Q4 - Who are involved in Piracy and armed robbery?

8.

Q4 – Quem são as pessoas envolvidas na pirataria e no assalto à mão armada?

9.

Q5 - What drives people to join these criminal activities?

10.

Q5 - O que conduz as pessoas a participarem nessas atividades criminosas?
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OBJECTIVE TWO: TO ASSESS HOW THIS THREAT CAN AFFECT THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF 2030 TRANSFORMATION AGENDA OF SAO
TOME AND PRINCIPE;
11.

Q1 - What is the main economic impact of piracy in Sao Tome and Principe?

12.

Q1 - Qual o principal impacto econômico dessas ameaças em São Tomé e
Príncipe?

13.

Q2 - How do they affect the livelihood of the people of Sao tome and
Principe?

14.

Q2 - Como elas afetam a subsistência da população de São Tomé e Príncipe?

15.

Q3 - How can the threat affect the stakeholders involved in import and export
and other maritime services?

16.

Q3 - Como as ameaças podem afetar as partes interessadas envolvidas na
importação e exportação e outros serviços marítimos?
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17.

Q4 - What are the government capabilities to handle the threat?

18.

Q4 - Quais são os recursos do governo para lidar com a ameaça?

OBJECTIVE THREE: SUGGEST MITIGATION STRATEGY TO
ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF MARITIME INSECURITY SAO TOME
AND PRINCIPE.
19.

Q1 - Which regulations does the country have against these maritime threats?

20.

Q1 – Que instrumentos jurídicos o país dispõe contra essas ameaças
marítimas?

21.

Q2 - How is this regulation being implemented?

22.

Q2 – Como esses instrumentos jurídicos estão a ser implementados?
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23.

Q3 - Does the country have the resources for countermeasures and maritime
domain answers?

24.

Q3 - O país tem recursos, contramedidas e respostas no domínio marítimo?

25.

Q4 - Does the country have the required personnel and training?

26.

Q4 - O país possui recursos humanos e treinamento necessários?

27.

Q5 -What is your opinion about military cooperation in place in this domain?

28.

Q5 – Qual é a sua opinião sobre a cooperação militar em vigor neste domínio?

29.

Q6 - Any further suggestions?
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30.

Q6 - Alguma sugestão?
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